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How to Reverse Trump’s Capitulation to Putin

  • Thread starter Thread starter Tamar Jacoby
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Last week was a relatively good week in Kyiv. Despite all the hype and hoopla swirling in the Western media, few Ukrainians expected much from the summit in Anchorage. But in the run-up to the meeting, Vladimir Putin was eager to get on Donald Trump’s good side, and he showed some restraint in launching missile and drone attacks. There were no significant air alerts in the capital city for a week. Residents got their first full night’s sleep in many months, and it showed in the mood—everyone seemed just a little kinder and more cheerful. “Now, if only we can survive the peace,” one active-duty soldier joked, looking ahead to the Alaska talks.

When the news came late Friday, no one in Kyiv was surprised that the meeting had fizzled. If anything, there was a sigh of relief—no deal had been made above Ukrainian heads.

Now the grim reality is setting in—in Kyiv and across the West. If all the silly talk and false hope leading up the summit served any purpose, it was to remind the world that war is still raging in Europe. It also helped concentrate minds—among Western publics and politicians—on the end game in Ukraine.

That’s why, when Trump summoned Ukrainian president Volodymir Zelensky to meet in D.C. on Monday, a team of European leaders including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the secretary-general of the NATO military alliance Mark Rutte, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz insisted on coming too, in a show of support for a tougher line in Ukraine and to shape the outcome of any future deal.

If the summit was a one-on-one contest, Putin won hands-down. Not only did the meeting legitimize his leadership and put an end to the isolation of Russia upheld by the West since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It also upended the terms of the East-West conversation about the war, with Trump dropping his insistence on a ceasefire and turning instead to Putin’s demand that the West address what the Russian dictator claims are the “root causes” of the conflict—Ukraine’s political independence from Russia, its maturing ties to the West, and the expansion of NATO into the former Russian and Soviet sphere of influence.

“It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a peace agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere ceasefire agreement, which often times do not hold up,” Trump posted on Truth Social after the talks. Translation: the president is willing to consider Putin’s claim that Russia should be able to curb Ukraine’s national sovereignty—Kyiv’s right to determine its own form of government, shape its own cultural identity, and choose its own allies, including, if it prefers, in the West. Trump also made clear there would be no additional U.S. sanctions—at least for now—on Russia or the third countries, like China, India, and Turkey, helping it fight the war.

It was a shameful performance by any standard and a low point for American global leadership. The question now: will Trump insist that Ukraine and Europe follow him down the path of negotiating on Putin’s terms—or can Kyiv and its European allies, at the upcoming meeting in Washington and the weeks and months ahead, persuade Trump to hold firm, resisting not just Putin’s preposterous claims on Ukrainian territory he has been unable to seize after more than a decade of fighting, but also his efforts to dictate a return to something like the Cold War division of Europe?

Ultimately, it’s a choice about how to end the war: the easy way—Trump’s way, giving in to Putin’s demands—or the hard way, by helping Ukraine hold its ground.

If we choose the hard way, the sad truth is there’s no magic wand and no real alternative to the tools the West is already using—arming Ukraine, punishing Putin economically, and insisting on our values, starting with the principle that borders can’t be redrawn by force. But we need to get serious about using these tools, wielding them like we mean it with a more clear-eyed understanding of the stakes.

What’s needed is a three-pronged effort.

The first leg of the stool is military assistance. On the third anniversary of the 2022 invasion, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy published a report reflecting on data it has been collecting since the fighting began—a precise accounting of the military, budgetary, and humanitarian aid donated by Ukraine’s Western allies. Both Europe and the U.S. have spent well over $125 billion. Europe has disbursed considerably more than the U.S.—nearly 50 percent more as of June 30—and its share is rising sharply, while Washington’s is now flat.

Most large donors, including Germany, the U.S., and Britain, have allocated just 0.2 percent of annual GDP, while smaller countries, mostly in southern Europe, have spent no more than 0.1 percent. German subsidies for diesel fuel cost taxpayers three times more per year than German military support for Ukraine. Overall, the institute concludes, “aid to Ukraine … looks more like a political ‘pet project’ than a major fiscal effort.”

So too with the second pillar, economic pressure. Both Europe and the U.S. have passed many packages of sanctions on Russia, and these measures have inflicted significant damage over the years. But Moscow keeps finding ways to get around Western restrictions—and despite Trump’s repeated threats to tighten the economic screws, U.S. sanctions enforcement has dwindled dramatically on his watch.

Europe’s 18th package of sanctions, passed in mid-July, is a step in the right direction. The most important and novel provision ties the cap on the price at which Russia can legally sell its crude oil to real-time fluctuations of the global going rate. Most Western nations have sharply reduced consumption of Russian oil since 2022, but it still accounts for some 40 percent of Moscow’s exports and one-third of its total budget. A vast “shadow fleet“ of aging, uninsured vessels carry Russian oil to China, India, and other third countries, and as the price has fallen in recent months—it’s now $63.80 per barrel—the $60 cap instituted in 2022 doesn’t mean much. The new European sanctions up the ante by reducing the cap to $47.60 and tying it to market fluctuations. But this will have a limited effect unless the U.S. also lowers the cap—and so far, Washington has shown no interest in doing so.

Also needed: much more granular enforcement of sanctions against shadow tankers and tighter restrictions on third-country trade with Russia—third-country imports of Russian goods, third-country banks financing the Russian economy, and third-country exports of dual-use technology essential for the Russian war machine. China is the big culprit here. In 2024, Beijing sold Moscow some $4 billion worth of electronic equipment and machine tools—everything from integrated circuits to semiconductor testing machines—that Russia used to make missiles, drones, tanks and other weaponry. Both Europe and U.S. are hesitant to impose tough sanctions on China, and the 100 percent tariff Trump has talked about in recent weeks would likely hurt Americans as much as China or Russia. But we need to find other, more effective ways of separating Moscow and Beijing.

The third and perhaps most important leg of the stool has more to do with resolve than force majeure. More military assistance and sharper economic pressure will not change Putin’s mind overnight—and may not in the long run enable Ukraine to liberate the nearly 20 percent of its territory now under Russian occupation. But if we mean what we say, we need to stay the course until Putin sees that he cannot win the war on his terms.

Trump’s on-again, off-again support for Ukraine sends the worst possible signal. So do respectful summits with red-carpet treatment and backchannel promises of lucrative East-West economic cooperation. What’s needed is to tighten the screws on Putin and increase his isolation. This may not bear fruit in the short term—there will be no quick, easy victories, and Trump will not win the Nobel Peace Prize. But we must make clear to Putin that the West will not give in on the “root causes” that are driving him to prosecute the war in Ukraine. Moscow must come to see that the costs of the conflict ultimately exceed the benefits, and he must understand, without any doubt, that the Kremlin cannot outwait the West.

Can the West reverse course now, undoing the damage Trump did in Alaska? If anything, the president seems to be doubling down on his mistake, calling for a trilateral summit—the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine—to pick up where he and Putin left off.

Zelensky and European leaders coming to Washington today seem willing to give Trump the benefit of the doubt, agreeing to participate in whatever next steps he sees fit. We can only hope that they or perhaps another show of Putin’s true reluctance to end the war will help Trump see the light before the U.S. insists on a meeting to make peace on Russia’s terms, ceding the principle that might makes right and big countries can do as they wish with their smaller neighbors.

The post How to Reverse Trump’s Capitulation to Putin appeared first on Washington Monthly.

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